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Abstract
Since the publication of the first National Strategy to Secure Cyber
Space in 2003 the US federal government has realized that due to the
interconnected nature of the Internet, securing the system would require
an industry-government partnership. However, defining exactly what that
new partnership would look like and how it would operate has been
unclear. The ramifications of this ambiguous strategy have been noted
elsewhere including the 2011 JSS article “A Relationship on the Brink”
which described the dysfunctional state of public private partnerships
with respect to cyber security. Subsequently, a joint industry-government
study of partnership programs has generated a consensus list of “best
practices” for operating such programs successfully. Moreover,
subsequent use of these principles seems to confirm their ability to
enhance the partnership and hopefully helps ameliorate, to some degree,
the growing cyber threat. This article provides a brief history of the
evolution of public-private partnerships in cyber security, the joint study
to assess them and the 12 best practices generated by that analysis.
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Introduction 
Shortly after taking office in 2009, President Barak Obama called for a 
comprehensive review of the nation’s approach to combating cyber threats. 
The President said:  
 
“The Federal Government cannot succeed in securing cyber space if it 
works in isolation. The public and private sectors interests are 
intertwined with a shared responsibility for ensuring a secure, reliable 
infrastructure upon which businesses and government depend…Only 
through such partnerships will the United States be able to enhance 
cyber security and reap the full benefits of the digital revolution.”1 
 
This article is an attempt to review the nation’s approach to combating cyber 
threats, and how “best practices” for public-private partnerships may help 
ameliorate—to some degree—growing cyber threats.  The first section 
describes a brief history of the evolution of cyber-focused public-private 
partnerships, followed by a discussion of case studies in how such 
partnerships have demonstrated effective results in enhancing cyber security 
through a robust assessment process.  The article concludes with 12 best 
practices generated by that analysis for more effective management of cyber 
partnership activities.  Ideally, partnerships would continue to evolve to share 
leadership, appreciate differing perspectives, and develop shared goals and 
priorities.  The digital economy increasingly requires this kind of collaborative 
environment to continue to flourish, encouraged by the meaningful cyber 
security accomplishments of public-private partnerships.   
 
A Brief History of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) for 
Cyber Security 
When the first National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space2 was written in 2003 
the mutually shared nature of the Internet led to the proposition that cyber 
space would best be secured through a partnership of mutual benefit.  It was 
assumed that industry’s natural interest would lead it to develop adequate 
technologies and practices to secure the expanding cyber systems. 
                                                          
1 Executive Office of the President, “Cyberspace Policy Review; Assuring a Trusted and 
Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure,” White House.gov, 2009, 
available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. 
2 President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, The National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace (Washington, D.C.: President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, 
2002). 
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Government’s role was initially thought to be primarily securing its own 
systems.  With respect to the private sector, government’s role was largely 
confined to education, international coordination and assisting with R&D.   
Market efficiency was assumed to be sufficient to drive adoption of adequate 
protective measures. 
 
By the time the first National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)3 was 
written in 2006 and updated in 20134 a more sophisticated understanding of 
digital economics made it apparent that the public and private sectors had 
“aligned, but not identical, interests” with respect to cyber security.  
Experience demonstrated that commercial security levels were generally 
lower than those required for national security and other governmental 
purposes.  The NIPP clarified that a voluntary partnership model that could 
respond to the quickly changing cyber environment was in the nation’s 
national and homeland security interests.  However, for this voluntary model 
to succeed, government would need to do more than just rely on naked 
market forces or traditional regulation to prompt the private sector to elevate 
its security spending to meet national security needs. 
 
The NIPP articulated the notion that, to create a sustainably secure cyber 
system, government could not rely on the private sector to continually make 
substantial investments that were commercially uneconomic.  Instead, an 
incentive system similar to those used to achieve social needs in sectors such 
as agriculture, environment, transportation and others would have to be 
evolved and applied to the cyber security partnership. 
 
“The success of the partnership depends on articulating the mutual 
benefits to government and private sector partners.  While articulating 
the value proposition to the government typically is clear, it is often 
more difficult to articulate the direct benefits of participation for the 
private sector...In assessing the value proposition for the private 
sector….government can encourage industry to go beyond efforts 
already justified by their corporate business needs to assist in broad 
scale CI/KR (critical infrastructure/key resource) protection through 
activities such as…supporting incentives for companies to voluntarily 
adopt widely accepted security practices.”5 
 
                                                          
3 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: 2006 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2006). 
4 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: 2013 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2013)  
5 Ibid., p. 15. 
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There were periodic efforts to redefine the partnership model to secure cyber 
space in such a way as to mimic the traditional government-industry 
regulatory model.  The most prominent of these efforts was legislation, which 
combined efforts of the Senate Homeland Security Committee and Commerce 
Committee in 2012.  This combined bill, drafted under the auspices of Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid and generally referred to as “Lieberman-Collins 
bill,” would have empowered the Department of Homeland Security to set 
cyber security mandates for large portions of the private sector and grant 
DHS compliance authority backed by substantial penalties for non-
compliance. It defined this new partnership in the following way: 
 
“This bill creates a dynamic partnership between government and the 
private sector in which the private sector is responsible for enhancing 
security of the nation’s most critical infrastructure while the 
government ensures effective oversight and compliance.”6 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, industry found this construction of the partnership 
somewhat strained. 
 
The idea that the private sector would fund national defense needs, including 
defending against potential nation-state attacks against critical infrastructure, 
was both naive and impractical.   As Busch and Austen Givens pointed out in 
one of the few academic analyses of public private partnerships, “Any 
business executive who suddenly announced he was increasing security 
spending by 25 percent for the good of the nation would almost certainly be 
fired.”7 
 
This is not to say that industry is unwilling to spend on cyber security.  In fact, 
industry spending on cyber security has more than doubled in recent years 
and is now over $100 billion a year.8  By comparison, DHS spending on cyber 
security is just over $1 billion annually and total federal government spending 
is under $15 billion.9 
 
                                                          
6 Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012).  
7 Nathan E. Busch, and Austen D. Givens, “Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland 
Security: Opportunities and Challenges,” Homeland Security Affairs 8: 18 (October 2012), 
available at: https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233. 
8 Ponemon Institute, "Cyber Security Incident Response: Are We as Prepared as We 
Think?" Lancope, (January 2014), available at 
http://www.lancope.com/files/documents/Industry-Reports/Lancope-Ponemon- 
Report-Cyber-Security-Incident-Response.pdf/ 
9 National Infrastructure Protection Plan: 2006.  
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In addition to the financial issues that undermine the attempt to define a 
traditional regulatory approach as a partnership, there were numerous other 
reasons why the regulatory approach to cyber security was ill founded, which 
have been detailed elsewhere.10  These include the generally unfounded 
assumption that the primary reason for successful cyber-attacks is corporate 
malfeasance by under-funding security as opposed to the inherent weakness 
in the technology and the sophistication of the attackers.  There has also been 
notable lack of success for the regulatory approaches that have been tried in 
this area, such as HIPPA (health care) and Gramm-Leech-Bliley (financial 
services), and the enormous negative economic impact that imposing a 
government-centric regulatory regime would have on goals as desirable as 
security such as innovation, economic growth, and job creation.11  As a result 
of all these problems and despite holding a strong majority in the Senate, the 
Lieberman-Collins bill couldn’t get enough support to even get to the floor. 
 
Following the collapse of the regulatory effort to impose cyber security 
mandates on critical infrastructure, President Obama issued Executive Order 
13636 in February of 2013, which was accompanied by PDD-25.  Both 
documents embraced the voluntary model of industry-government 
partnership for cyber security and more fully defined several of the elements 
that would be necessary for it to succeed.  The President’s Executive Order 
largely followed the “Cyber Security Social Contract” paradigm that had been 
proposed by a coalition of industry and privacy groups.12 
 
This renewed and more fully articulated partnership model called for industry 
to work collectively with government through the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) to identify industry based standards and 
practices worthy of voluntary adoption by critical infrastructure owners and 
operators.  This framework was to be voluntary, scalable, cost effective, and 
prioritized.  The Administration pledged not to seek additional regulatory 
powers for cyber security and to promote voluntary adoption of the targeted 
standards and practices through the deployment of market incentives.13 
 
In a rare case of bipartisanship, the Social Contract model contract was also 
embraced by the House GOP Task Force on cyber security that had been 
                                                          
10 Larry Clinton, "A Relationship on the Rocks: Industry-Government Partnership for 
Cyber Defense," Journal of Strategic Security 4: 2 (2011): 97-112. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Internet Security Alliance, “Improving our Nation’s Cybersecurity through the Public‐
Private Partnership,” White Paper, March 8, 2001. 
13 Executive order 13636; Section 7(d) 
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appointed by Speaker of the House John Boehner.14  By 2015 there had been 
such a consensus developed that cyber security would best be addressed 
through a voluntary industry-government partnership process that 
independent assessors were reporting that it was difficult to find anyone in 
the nation’s Capital who disagreed with the wisdom of the voluntary 
partnership model.15 
 
How to Make Public-Private Partnerships for Cyber Security 
Work: Case Studies 
Realizing that frustration with the partnership model was building in 2011, 
the IT Sector Coordinating Council (IT SCC) wrote to DHS Under Secretary 
for critical infrastructure, Rand Beers, and requested that DHS join with the 
IT SCC in a process to develop a set of collaborative guidelines for operating 
effective partnerships for cyber security.  Working together, the Government 
Coordinating Council (IT GCC) for IT and the industry sector coordinating 
council (IT SCC) devised a three-step program using an adaption of critical 
incident methodology. 
 
First, leaders from the SCC and GCC would select a sample of six programs 
that had sought to use the partnership as spelled out in the NIPP.  Second, 
since it was understood that government and industry could look at the same 
program and come to different conclusions as to its effectiveness, the GCC 
and SCC were asked to independently analyze the programs by accessing 
planning documents and interviewing key participants.  The goals of the 
interviews were to assess the participant’s judgment as to whether the 
programs were successful or unsuccessful in meeting their goals, and to 
identify characteristics of the programs that would explain why the programs 
were labeled as successful or unsuccessful.  Finally, the independent GCC and 
SCC leadership teams jointly analyzed all the results from step two and 
attempted to identify common elements that were used in successful and 
unsuccessful programs.  Both government and industry independently agreed 
which programs fit into the successful and less successful categories and were 
able to identify a dozen “best practices” that were found to have been 
commonly used in the successful projects and not in the less successful ones.  
The results of the study were presented at the annual 2012 IT/Comms 
Government-Industry “Quad” conference in 2012.  A summary of this analysis 
                                                          
14 Office of U.S. Representative Thornberry, “Recommendation of the House Republican 
Cyber Security Task Force,” October 2011, available at: 
http://thornberry.house.gov/uploadedfiles/cstf_final_recommendations.pdf. 
15 Jarno Limnell, "Cybersecurity Is a Team Sport," Politico, May 15, 2015, available at: 
http://www.politico.eu/article/cybersecurity-is-a-team-sport/.  
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and its results follows.16 
 
A Partnership Success Story: The 2006 National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP)  
Development of the 2006 NIPP was the result of a collaborative process that 
reflected multiple rounds of stakeholder review and comment during which 
the Department received thousands of individual comments.  The private 
sector was given the opportunity to participate in the NIPP 2006 drafting 
process and reported that DHS made a genuine effort to include them in its 
development.  The final 2006 NIPP recognized that partnership is the 
appropriate model for coordination between industry and DHS.  In addition, 
existing cross-sector organizations or their predecessors (like the Partnership 
for Critical Infrastructure Security) participated and provided a valuable cross 
sector viewpoint to the 2006 NIPP.  Both the government and industry 
leadership teams agreed that the process used to create the 2006 NIPP was an 
example of partnership success. 
 
What Was Successful and Unsuccessful in This Effort 
Early involvement by industry in the 2006 NIPP development was judged to 
be a key to a successful product.  The opportunity for industry to provide 
inputs as the document was being developed was judged by both DHS and the 
IT SCC as fundamental to the success of the final document.  Among the 
characteristics praised by both industry and the government were: 
 
 Co-drafting:  Reflection of private sector comments in the final 
language demonstrated that DHS respected and was listening to its 
partner. 
 Personal commitment by DHS:  DHS Assistant Secretary for 
Infrastructure Protection Robert Stephan owned the NIPP 2006 
process and was committed to partnership with all the stakeholders – 
including the critical infrastructures—in drafting it.  He frequently 
showed his engagement and leadership by engaging directly in draft 
language related discussions with stakeholder groups in calls or in 
person. 
 Personal commitment by industry:  The leaders of industry’s Sector 
Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Information Sharing and analysis 
Centers (ISACs) and other bodies were equally engaged. 
 
                                                          
16 Information Technology Sector Coordinating Committee, “Best Practices for 
Partnership,” Internet Security Alliance, 2012.  
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A Partnership Success Story: The IT Sector Baseline Risk 
Assessment 
The IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment was developed as part of the Sector’s 
implementation of the Sector Specific Plan (IT SSP).  The Risk Assessment 
departed from the traditional physical risk assessments, which focused on 
identifying critical assets and instead identified six “Critical Functions” that 
the IT Sector provides.  The goal of the assessment was to identify high 
consequence/high likelihood events to prioritize risk mitigation resources and 
efforts. 
 
Over 70 subject matter experts from industry and government participated in 
the development of the IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment.  The IT SCC and 
IT GCC each appointed a co-chair to the committee that developed the Risk 
Assessment, thereby providing joint authority and accountability.  The co-
chairs met regularly to develop and map timelines, plan future meetings, 
track ongoing initiatives, and resolve any conflicts.  The committee of 
industry and government subject matter experts met two to four times a 
month to develop the risk assessment methodology.  Both industry and 
government judged this program a successful partnership. 
 
What was Successful and Unsuccessful in this Effort 
Among the characteristics praised by both industry and the government were: 
 
 Having industry and government co-chairs ensured joint 
accountability and authority, with defined roles and responsibilities for 
each co-chair. 
 Committee decisions were made on a consensus basis, with extensive 
efforts to accommodate all reasonable considerations. 
Support staff captured action items and impartially drafted meeting 
materials based on committee discussions, as opposed to any pre-
determined or hidden agenda. 
 
A Partnership Success Story: The Cyber Space Policy Review 
Shortly after taking office, President Obama assigned staff of the National 
Security Council to conduct an intensive review of our nation’s cyber 
readiness—both public and private.  This process led to the publication of the 
Administration’s signature document on cyber security—The Cyber Space 
Policy Review (CSPR).  The CSPR was a “clean slate review” assessing all US 
policies and structures for cyber security.  The review team of government 
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cyber security experts actively engaged and received input from a broad cross-
section of industry, academia, the civil liberties and privacy communities, 
state governments, international partners and the legislative and Executive 
branches.  The review team systematically reached out to the specifically 
designated elements of the public private partnership as identified in the 
NIPP, such as the SCCs and the ISACs.  The process was multi-faceted 
including both public and private meetings of substantive nature and an 
active effort was made to solicit written input from stakeholders.  Both 
industry and government assessed this program as an example of a successful 
partnership. 
 
What was Successful and Unsuccessful in the Effort 
Among the characteristics praised by both industry and the government were: 
 
 Starting with a “clean slate”.  The review team did not betray a bias 
toward a particular ideology or approach but rather sought to openly 
solicit perspectives of all elements of the partnership and then 
integrate them into a coherent volume. 
 Broad stakeholder involvement.  The review team of government cyber 
security experts actively engaged and received input from a broad 
cross section of stakeholders.  The drafters clearly had listened to the 
various inputs as is evidenced in the numerous quotations from these 
inputs cited in the Review. 
 Utilizing the NIPP.  The review team systematically reached out to the 
specifically designated elements of the public private-partnership as 
identified in the NIPP. 
 Input.  An active effort was made to solicit written input from 
stakeholders. 
 Early engagement with the private sector. 
 
A Less Successful Partnership Effort: Industry Integration into 
the National Infrastructure Coordination Center 
Building a joint industry-government cyber operations center had been a 
longstanding goal of both industry and government.  Although this initiative 
was not technically a joint SCC and GCC initiative, it did involve open 
operational collaboration and engagement between industry and government.  
Specific NSTAC members created a Concept of Operations (Con Ops) for the 
joint operations center and it was subjected to a pilot program.  Members of 
the pilot program agreed to the Con Ops, thereby providing binding partners 
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to the same program rules and operations.  A common portal was used so that 
participating organizations could share information and see what others 
submitted and “Cross Sector Analysts” were responsible for doing additional 
correlation and analysis.  Both industry and government assessed this 
program as an example of a less successful partnership. 
 
What was Unsuccessful in this Effort 
While DHS used elements of the above program to attempt to build an 
integrated capability, the program was not developed in collaboration with 
industry.  As a result, analysts from both the IT SCC and the GCC identified 
various shortcomings with this program.  For example: 
 
 There was no common governing document or framework for the 
program. 
 Participants were not told who else was participating in the program, 
so they did not know who else was receiving the information they 
shared. 
 There was no clarity or transparency on the criteria used to determine 
who qualified for this program.   
 Instead of building situational awareness among participating 
organizations by providing access to the shared information on a 
common portal, only DHS analysts had access to the information 
shared by program participants. 
 
A Less Successful Partnership Effort: Information Technology 
Supply Chain Risk Management Collaboration 
Both industry and government had agreed to develop cohesive policy to 
manage cyber security supply chain risk.  Unfortunately, the private sector felt 
blocked in its efforts to collaborate due to the lack of information sharing 
regarding DHS efforts.  The private sector felt the lack of information sharing 
was undermining the public-private partnership as well as fueling the 
proliferation of multiple, uncoordinated efforts to address supply chain risk 
management issues within the U.S. Government. Both industry and 
government assessed this program as an example of a less successful 
partnership. 
 
What was Unsuccessful in this Effort 
Overall, the general lack of communication by government to industry was 
mutually judged to be unproductive and had the potential to breed 
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misinformation, which exacerbated the challenge of building an effective 
public-private effort. Specifically it was found that: 
 
 DHS did not share details or specific supply chain risk management 
assessment or evaluation criteria and other practices and policies that 
they were considering applying to the private sector. 
 DHS declined to engage in a substantive discussion regarding current 
IT supply chain risk management practices and standards or potential 
policies and regulations, when requested by the private sector. 
 
A Less Successful Effort: Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future—
The Cyber Security Strategy for the Homeland Security 
Enterprise Program and Fundamentally Altering the Public-
Private Partnership 
Although the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the Cyber Space 
Policy Review both articulated the need for a voluntary public-private 
partnership, and government officials publically had testified pledging their 
support for this effort, DHS launched a series of policy programs inconsistent 
with this direction. 
 
One prominent example was the so-called “Blueprint” and “Enterprise” 
programs.  The policy papers accompanying these programs argued that the 
voluntary partnership was not working and that there was a need to alter the 
voluntary public-private partnership and fundamentally change it into a 
traditional regulatory model.  At no point did DHS or any other federal 
agency engage the partnership model to explain why this change in 
philosophy had been reached, or what the evidence was that problems related 
to cyber security issues were the result of market failures.  When the existence 
of these efforts came to light, elements of the partnership were asked for only 
limited input and advised they would be engaged only at the implementation 
stages.  Both industry and government assessed this program as an example 
of a less successful partnership. 
 
What was Unsuccessful in this Effort 
Many in the private sector found it disingenuous for elements at DHS to 
advocate for a fundamentally different structure of the partnership model 
(switching from voluntary to a government mandate system) without ever 
engaging the partnership model to discuss the reasons for this dramatic 
change.  The lack of trust these efforts engendered was magnified as DHS 
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publically espoused the benefits of the partnership model.  The papers created 
ill will and undermined the ability for the partnership to function in the 
national interest.  As a result, the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure 
Security (PCIS ), which represents all critical industry sectors, formally 
protested these non-partnership activities to Secretary Napolitano and noted 
that the mistrust these programs engendered truncated partnership programs 
as DHS eventually acknowledged. Specific items cited as problematic in the 
“Blueprint” effort were: 
 
 While it is clearly stated in the NIPP that economics are a central issue 
in developing a sustainable cyber security partnership with the private 
sector, DHS never produced any economic analysis.  As a result the 
“blueprint for the cyber eco-system” failed to even consider one of the 
most central elements of that econ-system.  Analyses from both the 
government and industry agreed in retrospect that this critical 
omission would not have occurred if a more inclusive process had been 
used. 
 
Cyberstorm and National Level Exercise 
The Cyber Storm Exercise series and the National Level Exercise series have 
been opportunities to leverage the partnership to help manage risks.  National 
Level Exercises: NLE2012 was the first tier 1 exercise on cyber, and was an 
opportunity to leverage the partnership to enhance prevention, detection, and 
operational and policy response.  Many of the lessons learned through the 
Cyber Storm series however were not leveraged for NLE2012.  The exercise 
series has received mixed reviews with some notable successes and sustained 
criticism for the lack of follow through from the exercises.   
 
What was Unsuccessful in this Effort 
Analysts reported both successful and unsuccessful elements of the series. 
Among the successful items were: 
 
Early Strategic Engagement 
 Integrating participating communities in a joint coordinated planning 
process. 
 Enabling participating organizations and sectors to identify objectives, 
and ultimately harmonize those so that ALL participants gained value, 
and exercise play was appropriately synchronized and coordinated via 
a core scenario. 
 Establishing a National Private Sector Working Group to engage the 
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participation and expertise of a wide range of private sector 
stakeholders. 
 
Room for Improvement 
 While NLE 2012 raised awareness about cyber risks to a broader 
community and examined intergovernmental coordination to some 
degree, the insights could have been greater for all participants if the 
partnership had been more fully leveraged. 
 The findings and recommendations in NLE 2012 were notably similar 
to many recommendations from previous exercises, including the 
Cyber Storm Exercise series. Marginal improvements occurred, but 
meaningful and substantial progress to coordinate and enhance the 
collective cyber security response capability between government and 
industry was not made. 
 
Best Practices Generated by the Joint DHS Private Sector Case 
Studies 
Based on the joint government-industry analysis of the six partnership 
projects summarized above, a set of a dozen best practices that consistently 
generated successful partnership programs on both a substantive and 
operational maintenance level were agreed to.  Subsequently the PCIS, which 
is the body designated in the NIPP to represent all the critical industry 
sectors, endorsed the best practices and has urged DHS to officially embrace 
them as well.  As of this writing DHS has proposed a Memo of Understanding 
to the PCIS that will embrace these principles for operating future 
partnership programs.  These best practices are: 
 
 Senior level commitment to the partnership process communicated to 
staff & upper echelons. 
 Involvement at the priority/goal and objective phases of projects, not 
just implementation. 
 Use of the process identified in the NIPP for involving industry. 
 Reaching out to stakeholders early on, ideally at the “blank page” 
stage. 
 Continuous and regular interaction between government and industry 
stakeholders. 
 Providing adequate time for stakeholder review (equivalent to 
government review). 
 Establishing co-leadership of programs 
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 Consensus partnership decision making. 
 Communicating genuine interest in stakeholder input e.g. via co-
drafting. 
 Adequate engagement from federal agencies beyond DHS 
 Government follow through on partnership related decisions 
 Adequate and competent support services 
 
Following Best Practices in Regulated and Unregulated 
Industries: More Success Stories 
The NIST Cyber Security Framework 
President Obama’s Executive Order 13636 on Cyber security instructed NIST 
to launch a collaborative process with industry designed to develop a 
“framework” for critical infrastructure cyber security.  Rather than impose the 
subsequent framework by seeking additional regulatory authority, as it had 
done previously through the Lieberman-Collins bill, the Administration 
pledged to retain a voluntary approach supplemented by the deployment of a 
set of market incentives. 
 
This NIST process embodied virtually every one of the best practices 
identified in the IT Sector- DHS partnership study.  The President himself 
launched the process via an Executive Order and senior officials regularly 
reemphasized commitment to the process.  NIST made every effort to not 
only involve industry but also make the framework an “industry framework 
not a government framework.”  This included an extensive process of six 
national workshops across the country that brought in hundreds of 
stakeholders.  This process was complemented by an extensive series of 
private meetings with interested stakeholders.  NIST regularly updated drafts 
of the Framework with adequate time for industry review and comment and 
embraced comments and made substantial and clearly evident changes as the 
process matured.  NIST also did not display the sometimes-pernicious 
tendency of government agencies to claim “ownership” of the process.  
Perhaps, in part due to the clear direction directly from the President, NIST 
comfortably folded in adequate engagement from other government agencies. 
 
 Although at this writing the final Framework has only been out for just two 
years, the feedback has been nearly unanimous in praising the process. 
Michael Daniel, White House special assistant to the president and cyber 
security coordinator, has called industry’s response to the framework 
“phenomenal.”  A second White House official, Ari Schwartz, senior director 
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for cyber security, added that business support for the framework has 
“exceeded expectations.”  Such recognition is constructive and helps keep the 
private sector engaged in using the framework and promoting it with business 
partners.17 
  
From the industry side, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—which had 
vehemently opposed the Obama Administration’s earlier efforts on cyber 
security—now echoed the Administration’s assessment of the NIST process: 
 
“The Chamber believes that the release of the Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber security has been a 
remarkable success.  The Chamber, sector-based coordinating councils 
and associations, companies, and other private and public entities 
collaborated closely with NIST in developing the framework since the 
first workshop was held in April 2013.  Critical infrastructure sectors 
are keenly aware of and supportive of the framework.”18 
 
The financial services industry, one of the sectors most targeted and most 
severely affected by cyber- attacks, also expressed strong support for the NIST 
process.  
 
“Regarding the Framework development process, it was a success due 
in large part to its transparency and because it sought to harmonize 
various views into a cohesive whole.  We applaud that NIST’s process 
for developing the Framework engaged these other sectors during the 
Framework’s drafting.  NIST’s successful approach at inclusion of so 
many essential parties is reflected in how broadly embraced the 
Framework has become across so many sectors.”19 
 
However, a process that generates a positive effect is inadequate if the larger 
public policy goals are not met.  Here again, the NIST process seems to be 
generating commitment and advancement to improved cyber security: 
 
“With respect to the Framework, its true value is that it synthesizes a 
                                                          
17 Steven Chabinsky, "What is the Most Influential Cyber Security Team?" Security 
Magazine, September 1, 2013, available at: 
http://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/84677-what-is-the-most-influential-cyber-
security-team. 
18 U.S. Chamber of Commerice, Comments on the NIST Request for Information on the 
Cyber Framework, October 10, 2014, available at: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/cyberframework/rfi_comment_october_2014/20141010_uscc_egg
ers_rev1.pdf.  
19 Ibid. 
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process for cyber risk management that is accessible from the 
boardroom to the operations floor, across not only individual 
enterprises but also entire sectors.  It relies on international standards 
and is consistent with the regulatory requirements that have been in 
place for our sector for more than a decade.  It is a ‘Rosetta Stone’ in 
that it provides a common lexicon for categorizing and managing cyber 
risks across sectors and enterprises for various unifying risk 
management jargons and creates a common understanding around 
various risk management terms, methodologies, ideas and language. 
 
As a result, we have heard from member financial institutions that in 
terms of internal enterprise usage, Chief Information Security Officers 
(CISOs) are using the Framework to communicate ideas and achieve 
“buy-in” for various cyber security initiatives.  Externally, firms are 
beginning to use it to communicate expectations and requirements to 
vendors.”20 
 
CSRIC Working Group 4 (FCC and Communications Sector) 
The U.S. Department of Commerce has no regulatory authority and hence its 
sub-division, NIST, might be expected not to utilize a more traditional 
regulatory model when seeking to promote improved cyber security behavior 
in the private sector.  By contrast, many elements of the telecommunications 
sector come from a strong and varied regulatory history.  Hence, when the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) undertook the task of engaging 
the industries under its authority to promote improved cyber security 
practices it might have been expected that they would resort to a legacy model 
of federal regulations supplemented by adapting historic state and local 
authorities.  However FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler chose instead to call for a 
“new paradigm” to address the unique challenges of digital technology and 
asked industry and Commission staff to utilize the Communications Security, 
Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC Working Group 4) process to 
find a new way to implement the NIST Framework within the 
communications industry. 
 
CSRIC Working Group 4 launched a 6-month process to operationalize the 
“new paradigm” sought by Chairman Wheeler.  The process embraced 
virtually all of the previously identified best practices.  And much like the 
NIST process, the reviews from both government and industry have been 
starkly positive. 
 
In a featured speech at the 2015 RSA Security Conference, FCC Chairman 
Wheeler said Working Group 4: 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
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"…developed a range of activities intended to provide transparent 
assurances to the FCC, to DHS, to industry, and to consumers.  These 
visible assurances should provide confidence that companies 
throughout the sector are actually taking effective steps to manage 
cyber risk… I believe that CSRIC's assurance model will provide much-
needed accountability foCSr network security, while avoiding top-
down prescriptive regulation of industry practices.  A cooperative and 
collaborative approach is the FCC's preferred means of engagement. I 
have every reason to be confident the industry will live up to its 
commitments and deliver meaningful action.”21 
 
Conclusion 
Cyber security is one of the areas of public policy where substantial consensus 
has emerged.  There is broad agreement that the security problem is severe 
and growing and that the traditional regulatory model does not fit well with 
unique characteristics of the Internet and the conscious and sustained attacks 
on it.  Instead, a novel, voluntary, and economically sustainable partnership 
between industry and government needs to evolve.  Early efforts at 
partnership met with inconsistent success.   
 
More recently, however, industry and government have collaborated and 
identified a set of practical guidelines or “best practices” for managing cyber 
partnership activities.  This more sophisticated notion of partnership departs 
from having critical functions decided unilaterally by government, with 
industry’s role confined to comment, implementation, or compliance.  
Instead, the new partnership model requires, among other things, that the 
partners share leadership, appreciate each other’s differing perspectives, and 
develop partnership priorities, goals, and objectives together.   
 
Notwithstanding the mounting evidence that these partnerships, properly 
managed, are generating success in an extremely challenging arena, 
government agencies may be reluctant to depart from the traditional 
regulatory model for a model that requires more time and collaboration on 
the front end, and less traditional enforcement on the back end.  However, the 
digital economy of the 21st century may demand an evolution away from the 
legacy independent regulatory model developed in the 19th century.  When 
utilized, this approach has, at least initially, driven meaningful cyber security 
accomplishments. 
                                                          
21 Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman, Prepared Remarks for RSA Conference, April 21, 2015 in 
San Francisco, CA.   
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